In the swap game (SG) selfish players, each of which is associated to a vertex, form a graph by edge swaps, i.e., a player changes its strategy by simultaneously removing an adjacent edge and forming a new edge (Alon et al., 2013) . The cost of a player considers the average distance to all other players or the maximum distance to other players. Any SG by n players starting from a tree converges to an equilibrium with a constant Price of Anarchy (PoA) within O(n 3 ) edge swaps (Lenzner, 2011) . We focus on SGs where each player knows the subgraph induced by players within distance k. Therefore, each player cannot compute its cost nor a best response. We first consider pessimistic players who consider the worst-case global graph. We show that any SG starting from a tree (i) always converges to an equilibrium within O(n 3 ) edge swaps irrespective of the value of k, (ii) the PoA is Θ(n) for k = 1, 2, 3, and (iii) the PoA is constant for k ≥ 4. We then introduce weakly pessimistic players and optimistic players and show that these less pessimistic players achieve constant PoA for k ≤ 3 at the cost of best response cycles.
Introduction
Static and dynamic properties of networks not controlled by any centralized authority attracts much attention in last two decades as self-organizing large-scale networks play a critical role in a variety of information systems, for example, the Internet, Peer-to-Peer networks, ad-hoc networks, wireless sensor networks, social networks, viral networks, and so on. In these networks, participants selfishly and rationally change a part of the network structure to minimize their cost and maximize their gain. Controlling such networks is essentially impossible and many theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted; stochastic network construction models such as the BarabásiAlbert model were proposed, and key structural properties such as the small world networks [23] and the scale-free networks [3] have been discovered. Stochastic communication models such as the voting models [10, 21] , the random phone call model [14] , and the rewiring model [12] were proposed and many phase transition phenomena have been reported. Many problems related to broadcasting, gossiping, and viral marketing were also proposed [4, 11, 16] .
In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach to analyze dynamics and efficiency of the network structure resulting from local reconstruction by selfish agents. The network creation game (NCG) considers n players forming a network [13] . Each player is associated with a vertex of the network, can construct a communication edge connecting itself to another player at the cost of α, and can remove an adjacent edge for free. The cost of a player is the sum of the construction cost for edges and the communication cost, which is the sum of distances to all other players in the current network, i.e., the average distance to other players. Each player selfishly changes its strategy to minimize its cost and the social cost of a network is the sum of all players' costs. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of NCG is constant for almost all values of α [1, 9, 18, 19] , yet the PoA is not known for some values of α. However, computing the best response in NCG is NP-hard [13] , and this fact makes the NCG unrealistic in largescale networks. The NCG with another type of communication cost is proposed in [9] , where the cost of a player is the maximum distance to other players. We call this game the Max Network Creation Game (MAX-NCG) and the original NCG the Sum Network Creation Game (SUM-NCG). However, the SUM-NCG and the MAX-NCG ignores one of the most critical limitations in large-scale networks; each player cannot obtain "global" information. This type of locality is a fundamental limitation in distributed computing [22] , although players can neither compute its cost nor the best response without global information.
In this paper, we focus on games in such a distributed environment where each player cannot obtain the current strategy of all players nor have enough local memory to store the global information. Rather, players can access only local information. The NCG by players with local information is first proposed in [6] . Each player can observe a subgraph of the current graph induced by the players within distance k. We call this information the k-local information. The players are pessimistic in the sense that they consider the worst-case global graph when they examine a new strategy. Computing the best response for MAX-NCG is still NP-hard because k-local information may contain the entire network. For small k, more specifically, for 1 ≤ k ≤ α+1, PoA = Ω( n 1+α ) for MAX-NCG and for k ≤ c 3 √ α PoA = Ω(n/k) for SUM-NCG. These results contrast global information with local information. The SUM-NCG and MAX-NCG by players with global trace-route based information is proposed, yet PoA = Θ(n) for some values of α [5] . The NCG for more powerful players with k-local information is considered in [8] , where the players can probe the cost of a new strategy. Computing the best response is NP-hard for any k ≥ 1 while there exists tree equilibrium that achieves PoA = O(log n) and PoA = Ω( log n k ) for 2 ≤ k ≤ log n and PoA = Θ(n) for k = 1. For non-tree networks, depending on the values of α and k, we have PoA = O(n).
The swap game (SG) restricts strategy changes to edge swaps, i.e., simultaneously removing an edge and creating a new edge [2] . Thus, any strategy change does not change the number of edges in the network and the best response can be computed in polynomial time. Additionally, when we restrict initial networks to trees, a star achieves the minimum social cost. Above mentioned cost functions were adopted and these SGs are called the SUM-SG and the MAX-SG, respectively. The aim of SG is to omit parameter α from NCG with keeping the essence of NCG. The authors showed that the diameter of a tree equilibrium is two for the SUM-SG and at most three for the MAX-SG, while there exists an equilibrium with a large diameter in general networks. Thus, PoA of a tree equilibrium is always constant. Moreover, any SUM-SG and MAX-SG starting from a tree converges to an equilibrium within O(n 3 ) edge swaps while they admit best response cycles starting from a general graph [15, 17] . Consequently, local search at players with global information achieves efficient network construction for initial tree networks. The SUM-SG and MAX-SG with "powerful" players with k-local information is investigated in [8] . For k ≥ 2, the SUM-SG and MAX-SG starting from general networks admits best response cycles while convergence within O(n 3 ) moves is guaranteed for tree networks. However, to the best of our knowledge, SG with k-local information has not been considered.
Our results
In this paper, we investigate the convergence property and PoA of SGs by players with local information. First, we consider pessimistic players and demonstrate that starting from an initial tree, any SUM-SG and MAX-SG converge to an equilibrium within O(n 3 ) edge swaps in the same manner as [17] , i.e., we present a generalized ordinal potential function for the two games. We also show that convergence from a general network is not always guaranteed. Then, we present a clear phase transition phenomenon caused by the locality.
• When k = 1, 2, pessimistic players never perform any edge swap in the SUM-SG and in MAX-SG. Any network is an equilibrium of the two games, thus PoA = Θ(n).
• When k = 3, in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG, there exists an equilibrium of diameter Θ(n), thus PoA = Θ(n).
• When k ≥ 4, in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG the diameter of every equilibrium is constant, thus PoA is constant.
We then introduce weakly-pessimistic players and optimistic players to obtain a better PoA for k ≤ 3. A weakly pessimistic player performs an edge swap even when its cost does not decrease. This relaxation results in a constant PoA of the MAX-SG when k = 3 at the cost of best response cycles. An optimistic player assumes the best-case global graph for an edge swap and this optimism results in a constant PoA of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG for any value of k. Consequently, the combination of k-locality for k ≥ 4 and pessimism enables distributed construction of efficient trees by selfish players.
Related works
We briefly survey existing results of the NCG and SG for players with global information.
Regarding the SUM-NCG, when α ≤ n 1−ε for ε ≥ 1/ log n the PoA is O(3 1/ε ) [9] . Thus, when n is sufficiently large, the PoA is bound by a constant. When α > 4n+13, the PoA is at most 3 + 2n/(2n + α) [7] . In addition, any constant upper bound of PoA for n ≤ α ≤ 4n + 13 is not known and the best upper bound is O(2 √ lg n ) [9] . If every equilibrium is a tree, then PoA < 5 and an interesting conjecture is that every equilibrium is a tree for sufficiently large α [13] . Regarding the MAX-NCG, the PoA is 2 O( √ lg n) and it is constant when α = O(n −1/2 ) or α > 129 [19] .
Regarding the SUM-SG, there exists an equilibrium with diameter 2 O( √ lg n) while the diameter of any equilibrium is at most two (thus, a star) if an initial graph is a tree [2] . Regarding the MAX-SG, there exists an equilibrium with diameter Θ( √ n) while the diameter of any equilibrium is at most three if an initial graph is a tree [2].
Organization
Preliminary section introduces the SGs and pessimistic players with local information. In the next section, we analyze the dynamics and PoA of SGs by pessimistic players. In the following section, we introduce less pessimistic players and present best response cycles and equilibria with small diameter. Finally, we conclude this paper with open problems.
Preliminaries
A swap game (SG) by players with k-local information is denoted by (G 0 , k), where G 0 = (V, E 0 ) is an initial network and integer k is the size of each player's "visibility". G 0 is a simple undirected connected graph, where |V | = n and |E 0 | = m. We say u ∈ V is adjacent to v ∈ V if edge {u, v} is an element of E. Each player is associated to a vertex in V and the strategy of a player u ∈ V is the set of its incident edges.
Each player can change its strategy by an edge swap, i.e., removing one incident edge and creating a new edge. Starting from G 0 , a sequence of edge swaps generates a network evolution G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , . . ..
Let N G (u) be the set of adjacent vertices of u ∈ V in G and d G (u, v) be the distance between u, v ∈ V in G. When G is not connected and v is not reachable from u, d G (u, v) = ∞. The cost of a player depends on the current graph G. We consider two different types of cost functions, c SUM,u (G) and c MAX,u (G) defined as follows:
When G is not connected, c SUM,u (G) = ∞ and c MAX,u (G) = ∞. We call a swap game where each player u uses c SUM,u the sum swap game (SUM-SG) and a swap game where each player u uses c MAX,u the max swap game (MAX-SG). When it is clear from the context, we omit the name of the game and use c u .
Each player u can access local information determined by G. Let V G,k (u) denote the set of vertices within distance k from u in G (thus, the k-neighborhood of u). Player u can observe the subgraph of G induced by V G,k (u) and we call this subgraph the view of u. We say the information at u is k-local and we call its view the k-local information of u. We assume that each player does not know any global information such as the values of n and m.
In a transition from G t to G t+1 , a single player performs an edge swap. Consider the case where a player u performs an edge swap (
We call u the moving player in G t . The resulting graph is G t+1 = (V, E \{{u, v}}∪{{u, w}}). Note that the number of edges does not change in a SG.
Due to local information, each player cannot compute its current cost nor the improvement by a strategy change. We first consider pessimistic players that consider the worst-case improvement for each possible edge swap and select one that achieves positive improvement. A player u is unhappy if it has an edge swap that decreases its cost in the worst-case global graph. In other words, there exists at least one edge swap (v, w) at u that satisfies
where G u is the set of simple undirected connected graphs consisting of finite number of vertices and compatible with u's local view, and H is a graph obtained by the edge swap (v, w) at u in H ∈ G. We assume that a moving player always performs an edge swap (v, w) with ∆ u (v, w) > 0. When every player u is not unhappy with respect to c SUM,u (G) in graph G, we call G a sum-swap equilibrium. When every player u is not unhappy with respect to c MAX,u (G) in graph G, we call G a max-swap equilibrium. When a graph is a sum-swap equilibrium and a max-swap equilibrium we simply call the graph swap equilibrium.
We define the social cost SC(G) of a graph G as the sum of all players' costs, i.e., SC(G) = u∈V c u (G). Let G(n, m) be the set of simple undirected connected graphs of n players and m edges and G SUM (n, m, k) be the set of sum-swap equilibrium graphs of n players with k-local information and m edges. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the SUM-SG is defined as follows:
In the same way, the PoA of the MAX-SG is defined for the set G MAX (n, m, k) of max-swap equilibrium graphs of n players with k-local information and m edges. The PoA of the SUM-SG (and MAX-SG) starting from a tree is denoted by PoA SUM (n, n − 1, k) (PoA MAX (n, n − 1, k), respectively).
A strategic game has the finite improvement property (FIP) if every sequence of improving strategy changes is finite [20] . Thus, from any initial state, any sequence of finite improving strategy changes reaches an equilibrium. Monderer and Shapley showed that a strategic game has the FIP if and only if it has a generalized ordinal potential function. Regarding a swap game, a function Φ : G n,m → R is a generalized ordinal potential function if we have the following property for every graph G ∈ G n,m , every unhappy player u, and every edge swap (v, w) that makes u unhappy,
where G is a graph obtained by the edge swap (v, w) at u. That is, any transition in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG satisfies the above property for the moving player.
The best response of a player u in G t is an edge swap (v, w) that maximizes ∆ u (v, w). We call an evolution G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G i (= G 0 ) a best response cycle when each moving player in G t performs a best response for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , i − 1.
We further introduce some notations for graph G = (V, E). For a set of vertices V ⊆ V the graph obtained by removing vertices in V and their incident edges is denoted by G \ V . Additionally, for a set of edges E ⊆ E the graph obtained by removing edges in E is denoted by G \ E . The vertex set and the edge set of a graph G is denoted by V (G ) and E(G ), respectively.
Convergence properties for pessimistic players
In this section, we investigate the dynamics of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players with local information. We first consider general settings where the initial graph is not a tree and multiple players perform edge swaps simultaneously. We show that the two games admit best response cycles. We then demonstrate that when the initial graph is a tree, the SUM-SG and MAX-SG have the FIP and converges to an equilibrium within polynomial number of edge swaps.
Impossibility in general settings
We first present several necessary conditions for an evolution of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by players with local information to reach an equilibrium. We first present the necessary visibility for each player to change their strategies.
Theorem 1 In the SUM-SG and MAX-SG, when k ≤ 2, no player is unhappy in an arbitrary graph. Thus, any graph is a swap equilibrium.
Proof.
When k = 1, no player can perform an edge swap because V G,1 (u) \ N Gt (u) = ∅ at any u ∈ V .
When k = 2, we first consider the SUM-SG. Assume player u is unhappy because of edge swap (v, w) in graph G. Let G be the graph obtained by this edge swap.
In a worst-case global graph, w has no adjacent vertex other than those in V G,2 (u) and the cost of u decreases by at most one by this edge swap. In G , v must be reachable from u. There exists at least one player that is in V G,2 (u) and adjacent to v, otherwise v is not reachable from u in a worst-case global graph. Hence,
Next, we consider the MAX-SG. Assume player u is unhappy because of edge swap (v, w) in graph G. Thus, d G (u, w) = 2 and w is the only player at distance 2 from u in V G,2 (u) otherwise u is not unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w) in G. Let G be the graph obtained by this edge swap. In a worst-case global graph, w has no adjacent vertex other than those in V G,2 (u) and the cost of u is expected to be reduced to 1. By the same discussion above, v is reachable from u in G , however d G (u, v) = 2. Hence, the maximum distance from u to players in V G ,2 (u) is still two, thus ∆ u (v, w) ≤ 0. Hence, u is not unhappy in G.
The following theorem justifies our assumption of a single edge swap in each transition.
Theorem 2 When k ≥ 3, if multiple players change their strategies simultaneously, the SUM-SG and MAX-SG admit best response cycles.
We first consider the SUM-SG. Consider a path of four players u, v, w, and x aligned in this order. When k ≥ 3, the two endpoint players u and x are unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w) and (w, v), respectively. If the two players perform the edge swaps simultaneously, the resulting graph is again a path graph, where u and x are unhappy.
The above example is also a best response cycle in the MAX-SG. Finally, we consider dynamics of SGs starting from an arbitrary initial graph. Lenzner presented a best response cycle for the SUM-SG by players with global information [17] . During the evolution, the distance to any player from a moving player is always less than four and we can apply the result to the SUM-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information for k ≥ 3. In addition, the edge swaps are also best responses in the MAX-SG. Hence, we can also apply the result to the MAX-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information for k ≥ 3. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 When k ≥ 3, there exists an initial graph from which the SUM-SG and MAX-SG admit a best response cycle.
In the following, we concentrate on the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information for k ≥ 3 starting from a tree. As defined in the preliminary, a single player changes its strategy in each transition.
Convergence from an initial tree
In this section, we show that the SUM-SG and MAX-SG have the FIP. For players with global information, generalized ordinal potential functions for the SUM-SG [17] and MAX-SG [15] have been proposed. We can use these generalized ordinal potential functions for pessimistic players with local information.
Theorem 4 If G 0 is a tree, any SUM-SG (G 0 , k) has the FIP and reaches a sum-swap equilibrium within O(n 3 ) edge swaps.
Proof.
We show that Φ SUM = SC(G) is a generalized ordinal potential function for the SUM-SG irrespective of the value of k. Consider a tree G t where an arbitrary unhappy player u performs an edge swap (v, w) that yields a new graph G t+1 . We have ∆ u (v, w) > 0.
Lenzner showed that for players with global information SC
Lenzner also showed that when the graph is a path of n vertices, Φ SUM achieves the maximum value of Θ(n 3 ), and if the graph is a star of n vertices, Φ SUM achieves the minimum value of Θ(n 2 ). Hence, the number of edge swaps is O(n 3 ).
We next show the FIP of the MAX-SG. Kawald and Lenzner presented a generalized ordinal function for the MAX-SG by players with global information [15] . Their generalized ordinal function is an n-tuple of players' costs, where the players are sorted in the descending order of their costs. We apply their function to the MAX-SG by pessimistic players with local information, however, we found that their proof needs small correction. In the following, we provide a new proof for their function.
Consider the case where an unhappy player u performs an edge swap (v, w) in G t and a new graph G t+1 is formed. Graph G t \ {{u, v}} consists of two trees and let G u t be the tree containing vertex u and G v t be the tree containing vertex v. We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6 Any player y ∈ V (G v t ) satisfies at least one of the following two conditions; (i) there exists a player
Proof. For an arbitrary player y ∈ V (G v t ), let
We have the following three equations;
The third equation holds because during the transition from G t to G t+1 any distance between vertices in V (G u t ) (and V (G v t ), respectively) does not change. The last line is bounded by 0 because d Gt+1 (u, y) = 1 + d Gt+1 (w, y)
otherwise u was not unhappy in G t . Thus, the first condition is satisfied.
and the second condition is satisfied.
We define Φ MAX (G) for a graph G as an n-tuple (c u1 (G), c u2 (G), . . . , c un (G)) where c ui (G) ≥ c ui+1 (G) for i = 1, 2, · · · , n−1. We assume that ties are broken arbitrarily. We then consider lexicographic ordering of n-tuples. For two n-tuples C = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) and C = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) where c i , c i ∈ Z for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, when ∆ = (c 1 − c 1 , c 2 − c 2 , . . . , c n − c n ) = 0 and the leftmost non-zero entry of ∆ is positive, we say C is lexicographically larger than C , denoted by C > lex C .
Theorem 7 If G 0 is a tree, a MAX-SG (G 0 , k) has the FIP and reaches a max-swap equilibrium within O(n 3 ) edge swaps.
We demonstrate that any transition from G t to G t+1 satisfies Φ MAX (G t ) > lex Φ MAX (G t + 1). Let u be the moving player in G t and x be the player with the maximum cost in G u t . Then, in G v t , there may exist a player with larger cost than c x (G t ). We sort these players in the descending order of their costs and let y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y p be the obtained sequence of players and y p+1 , . . . , y q be the remaining players in G v t . We first show that any y j (1 ≤ j ≤ p) satisfies c yj (G t ) ≥ c yj (G t+1 ). If the second condition of Lemma 6 holds for all y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y p , we have the property. Otherwise, there exists y j that does not satisfy the second condition but the first condition. However, we have c yj (G t ) ≥ c x (G t ) and by the proof of Lemma 6, c x (G t ) > c yj (G t+1 ) holds. This is a contradiction and all y j satisfies c yj (G t ) ≥ c yj (G t+1 ).
Then we consider a player v ∈ V (G u t ) ∪ {y p+1 , y p+2 , . . . , y q }. By Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 such player v satisfies c
We can bound the number of edge swaps in the same manner as [15] . By Theorem 4 and 7, when an initial graph is a tree, the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players with local information converge to a sum-swap equilibrium and max-swap equilibrium, respectively within O(n 3 ) edge swaps.
PoA for pessimistic players
In this section, we analyze PoA of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players with local information. Alon et al. showed that for players with global information, the diameter of a tree swap equilibrium is constant for the two cost functions, thus PoA is also constant [2] . On the other hand, our results show the clear contrast by the value of k. When k = 3, there exists a sum-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n) and a max-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n). Thus, PoA is Θ(n) for both games. When k ≥ 4, the diameter of any sum-swap equilibrium is at most two and that of any max-swap equilibrium is at most three. Thus, the PoA is bounded by a constant for both games.
In the following, we consider a path in a graph. A path P of length is denoted by a sequence of vertices on it, i.e., P = v 0 v 1 . . . v . The set of vertices that appear on P is denoted by V (P ) and the set of edges of P is denoted by E(P ). Given a tree G = (V, E) and a path P = v 0 v 1 v 2 . . . v in G, consider the forest G = (V, E \ E(P )) and let T G,P (v i ) denote the connected component (thus, a tree) containing v i . We consider v i as the root of T G,P (v i ) when we address the depth of T G,P (v i ). The following lemma provides a basic technique to check the existence of an unhappy player.
Lemma 8
In the SUM-SG, when k = 3, a player u in a tree G is unhappy if and only if there exists a path P = uvw that satisfies the following two conditions; (i) the depth of T G,P (v) is at most one, and (ii) |V (T G,P (v))| < |N T G,P (w) (w)|.
Proof. We first show that u is unhappy if the two conditions hold. Assume that there is a path P = uvw satisfying the two conditions. See Figure 1 . Let G be the graph obtained by the edge swap (v, w) at u in G. For every x ∈ V (T G,P (v)), d G (u, x) = d G (u, x) + 1 and for every y ∈ N T G,P (w) (w) d G (u, y) = d G (u, y) − 1. By condition (i), u knows that the edge swap (v, w) increases the distance to x ∈ V (T G,P (v)). By condition (ii), u knows that the edge swap (v, w) decreases its cost by at least |N T G,P (w) (w)|. In the worst-case global graph, w has no adjacent players other than N T G,P (w) (w). Hence,
and u is unhappy because of this edge swap (v, w).
Next, we show that u is unhappy in G only if the two conditions hold. Consider the case where for any path P = uvw, (i') the depth of T G,P (v) is larger than one, or (ii') |V (T G,P (v))| ≥ |N T G,P (w) (w)| holds. We show that any player u ∈ V is not unhappy. We check an arbitrary edge swap (v , x ) at u. Thus, v ∈ N G (u) and x ∈ V G,3 (u) \ N G (u). G must have a path between v and x , otherwise the edge swap (v , x ) disconnects the players. If u cannot see this path, in the worst case global graph, v is not reachable from u. Hence, G contains a path uv w x or uv x .
If G contains a path uv w x , the edge swap
The worst-case global graph for the edge swap (v , x ) is a graph where x is not adjacent to any other vertex in V (G)\V G,3 (u). Thus, ∆ cu (v , x ) ≤ 0. Hence, u is not unhappy with respect to the edge swap (v , x ).
If G contains a path P = uv x and condition (i') holds, there exist vertices v 1 , v 2 ∈ T G,P (v ) that form a path uv v 1 v 2 . In the worst case global graph for the edge swap (v , x ), v 2 has many children whose distance from u increases by one in G . Hence, ∆ cu (v , x ) ≤ 0 and u is not unhappy with respect to the edge swap (v , x ).
If G contains a path P = uv x and condition (ii') holds, in the worst-case global graph for the edge swap (v , x ), the number of players whose distance from u decreases by one with the edge swap (v , x ) is |N T G,P (w) (w)| and the number of players whose distance from u increases by one is lower bounded by |V (T G,P (v))|. Thus, ∆ cu (v , x ) ≥ |N T G,P (w) (w)|−|V (T G,P (v))| ≤ 0 holds and player u is not unhappy with respect to the edge swap (v , x ).
Consequently, u is not unhappy with respect to any edge swap.
Theorem 9 When n ≥ 13 and k ≤ 3, PoA SUM (n, n − 1, k) = Θ(n).
Proof.
We present a sum-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n). We define a tree T S(p) with a spine path of length p as follows: For i = 1, 2, · · · , p, H i is a tree, where a i has four children b i , c i , d i , and e i . For i = 0, p + 1, H i is a tree rooted at a i with three children b i , c i , and d i . T S(p) is a tree defined by We show that for each u ∈ V (T S(p)) (p ≥ 3), any path P = uvw does not satisfy the two conditions of Lemma 8. First, consider the case where u is a leaf of T S(p). Then, v is a i for some i = 0, 1, · · · , p + 1. If w is a leaf, the depth of T G,P (v) is larger than one, and the first condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied. If w is an internal vertex, |V (T G,P (v))| = 3 and |N T G,P (w) (w)| = 3, and the second condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied.
Second, consider the case where u is an internal vertex of T S(p). Then, v is also an internal vertex otherwise we cannot find w. When the depth of T G,P (v) is larger than one, the first condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied. When the depth of T G,P (v) is one, v is a i for some i = 0, 1, · · · , p + 1 and w is a leaf. Thus, |V (T G,P (v))| = 3 and |N T G,P (w) (w)| = 1, and the second condition of Lemma 8 is not satisfied.
Thus, every player is not unhappy and T S(p) is a sum swap equilibrium. We then calculate the social cost in T S(p), that consists of 5p + 8 vertices. When n = 5p + 8 for any integer p, we have the same bound by attaching extra vertices to some a i .
SC(T S(p))
Since star is a sum-swap equilibrium with the minimum social cost, the PoA of T S(p) is Θ(n).
By T S(p), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 10 There exists a sum-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n) for any n ≥ 13.
We now demonstrate that when k ≥ 4, sum-swap equilibrium for pessimistic players with k-local information achieves the same PoA as that with global information.
We first show the following lemma. 
Lemma 11
In an arbitrary tree G whose diameter is larger than two, there exists a path P = vabw that satisfies the following two conditions; (i) |V G T ,P (a),2 (a)| ≤ |V G T ,P (b),2 (b)|, and (ii) the depth of T G,P (a) is at most two.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. There exists at least one path of length at least three in G. We choose a path P = vabw arbitrarily. Let By Lemma 11, in any graph G whose diameter is larger than two there exists an unhappy player.
Theorem 12 When G 0 is a tree and k ≥ 4, any sum-swap equilibrium is a star and PoA SUM (n, n − 1, k) = 1.
Proof. Assume that there exists a sum-swap equilibrium G whose diameter is larger than two. By Lemma 11, there exists a path P = vabw that satisfies the two conditions. Hence, v is unhappy because
This is a contradiction and G is not a sum-swap equilibrium. Hence, the diameter of a sum-swap equilibrium is smaller than or equal to two and we have the statement.
Consequently, the "visibility" of pessimistic players has a significant effect on the PoA of the SUM-SG. We then demonstrate that this is also the case for the MAX-SG.
Theorem 13 When n ≥ 6 and k = 3, PoA MAX (n, n − 1, k) = Θ(n).
Proof. We show that a tree shown in Figure 4 is a max-swap equilibrium.
First, consider the two endpoint vertices. Each endpoint player has one incident edge and any edge swap involving this edge does not decrease the maximum distance to the vertices in its view. In the worst-case global graph the player at distance two has no other vertices. Thus, the two endpoint players are not unhappy. Second, consider other leaves. Each leaf player has one incident edge and any edge swap at a leaf increases the maximum distance to some vertex in its view. In the worst-case global graph, there is a long path starting from such a vertex. Hence, the leaf players are not unhappy.
Finally, consider inner vertices. Each inner player has three edges but it cannot remove the edge connecting it to a leaf because such an edge swap disconnects the graph. If the player remove an edge incident to another inner vertex and create a new edge, by the same discussion as above, this edge swap increases the maximum distance to some vertex in its view and the player is not unhappy.
Consequently, the graph shown in Figure 4 is a max-swap equilibrium. By adding inner vertices (with its child), we have the similar equilibrium for any even n ≥ 6. For odd n ≥ 6, we attach an extra player to an inner vertex and obtain a max swap equilibrium.
Since the star graph is an max-swap equilibrium with the minimum social cost, we have PoA = Θ(n).
By the proof of Theorem 13, we have following corollary.
Corollary 14 There exists a max-swap equilibrium of diameter Θ(n) for any n ≥ 6.
We now demonstrate that when k ≥ 4, any MAX-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information achieves the same PoA as that of players with global information. The following lemma shows that in any tree of diameter larger than three, there is at least one unhappy player.
Lemma 15
In any tree G whose diameter is larger than three, there exists a path P = vabcw that satisfies the following two conditions; (i) P starts from a leaf v, and (ii) the depth of T G,P (a) is at most one.
Proof.
There exists at least one path of length at least four in G. We arbitrarily choose a path P = vabcw that starts from some leaf v. If the depth of T G,P (a) is smaller than two, the statement holds. If the depth of T G,P (a) is larger than one, choose a leaf v in T G,P (a) and its parent vertex, say a . There exists at least one path P = v a b c w and P satisfies the second condition.
Theorem 16 When G 0 is a tree and k ≥ 4, the diameter of any max-swap equilibrium is at most three and PoA MAX (n, n − 1, k) ≤ 3/2.
Proof. Assume that there exists a max-swap equilibrium G whose diameter is larger than three. By Lemma 15, there exists a path P = vabcw such that v is a leaf and the depth of T G,P (a) is at most one. Player v is unhappy because ∆c v (a, b) ≥ 1. This is a contradiction and G is not a max-swap equilibrium. Thus, the diameter of any max-swap diameter is at most three.
Because a equilibrium with the minimum cost is a star, the PoA is bounded by 3/2.
Swap games with non-pessimistic players
We demonstrated that when k = 2, 3, the PoA for pessimistic players is Θ(n) in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG. In this section, we introduce less pessimistic players to obtain smaller PoA for these cases. We consider two types of non-pessimistic players: A player u is weakly pessimistic if u is unhappy when there exists an edge swap (v, w) at u such that ∆c
where H is a graph obtained by an edge swap (v, w) at u in H ∈ G.
Weakly pessimistic players and optimistic players do not perform any edge swap in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG when k = 1. Different from Theorem 1, weakly pessimistic players change their strategies when k = 2. However, when k > 2, weakly pessimistic players cause a cycle of edge swaps from an initial path graph.
Example 1 Let P = u 0 u 1 u 2 . . . be a path of n (≥ 2k) weakly pessimistic players with k-local information. In the SUM-SG and MAX-SG, player u k is unhappy because of the edge swap (u k−1 , u 0 ). However after u k performs this edge swap, the graph is u k−1 u k−2 . . . u 0 u k u k+1 . . . u n and u k is again unhappy because of the edge swap (u 0 , u k−1 ). By selecting u k forever, the graph never reach an equilibrium.
We now consider a more restricted round robin scheduling for selecting moving players. In a round-robin scheduling, players have a fixed ordering and at each time step a moving player is selected according to this ordering. Consider n players u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n and let the subscript i indicate the order of player u i . In G 0 if u 1 is unhappy, u 1 is selected as the moving player. Otherwise, we check u 2 , u 3 , . . . until we find an unhappy player. Thus, the unhappy player with the smallest order, say j, is selected as a moving player. In G 1 if u j+1 is unhappy, u j+1 is selected as the moving player. Otherwise, we check u j+2 , u j+3 , . . . until we find an unhappy player. If u n is selected in G t , the check start with u 1 in G t+1 .
However, the round-robin scheduling still admits a best response cycle.
Example 2 Consider a a path P 0 = u 3 u 1 u 4 u 2 of four weakly pessimistic players with k-local information for k ≥ 2. For the SUM-SG, in P 0 , u 1 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u 4 , u 2 ). When u 0 performs this edge swap, a new path P 1 = u 3 u 1 u 2 u 4 is formed. In P 1 , u 2 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u 1 , u 3 ). When u 2 performs this edge swap, a new path P 3 = u 1 u 3 u 2 u 4 is formed. In P 3 , u 3 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u 2 , u 4 ). When u 3 performs this edge swap, a new path P 4 = u 1 u 3 u 4 u 2 is formed. In P 4 , u 4 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u 3 , u 1 ). When u 4 performs this edge swap, a new path P 5 = u 3 u 1 u 4 u 2 = P 0 is formed. This is a best response cycle in the SUM-SG and MAX-SG.
Moreover, we can show that there exists a best response cycle from an initial tree.
Theorem 17 When k ≥ 3, for weakly pessimistic players with k-local information, there exist infinitely many trees from which the SUM-SG and MAX-SG admit best response cycles under the round-robin scheduling.
Proof.
We present an initial tree G 0 for the SUM-SG by n = 2m + 3 weakly pessimistic players u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u 2m+3 (m = 2, 3, . . .). The players are divided into two subtrees rooted at u 2m+3 and u 2m+2 , respectively; u 2m+3 has m + 1 leaves u 1 , u 3 , . . . , u 2m+1 and u 2m+2 has m leaves u 2 , u 4 , . . . , u 2m . Additionally, G 0 contains an edge connecting u 2m+3 and u 2m+2 . See Figure 5 for n = 9.
In G 0 , u 1 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u 2m+3 , u 2m+2 ); u 2m+3 and u 2m+2 have m leaves except u 1 . When u 1 performs this edge swap, a new graph G 1 is formed, where u 2m+3 has m leaves and u 2m+2 has m + 1 leaves. In G 1 , u 2 is unhappy because of the edge swap (u 2m+2 , u 2m+3 ). When u 2 performs this edge swap, a new graph G 2 is formed, where u 2m+3 has m + 1 leaves and u 2m+2 has m leaves. In this way, the leaves of a graph keep on changing their parent under the round robin scheduling. The seesaw game continues until G 2m where u 2m+3 has m leaves with even subscripts and u 2m+2 has m + 1 leaves with odd subscripts. Player u 2m+2 is not unhappy in G 2m ; the only possibility is an edge swap (u 2m+3 , u 2 ) for some ∈ {2, 4, . . . , m}, but it increases its cost. Player u 2m+3 is not unhappy in G 2m with the same reason. Player u 1 is unhappy in G 2m , and the leaf players start the seesaw game again.
This cycle is also a best response cycle in the MAX-SG. Next, we present the PoA for weakly pessimistic players with 2-local information.
Lemma 18
In the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by weakly pessimistic players with 2-local information, a player u is unhappy if and only if there is a path uvw where the degree of v is two.
Proof.
We first consider the SUM-SG. If there is a path uvw in G such that the degree of v is two, u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w). In the worst-case global graph, w does not have any adjacent player except v and the cost decreases by one. On the other hand, the edge swap (v, w) increases the distance between u and v by one.
If u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w) in G, d G (u, v) = 1 and d G (u, w) = 2. Let G be the graph obtained by the edge swap (v, w) at u in G. Graph G must contain a path between v and w otherwise players are disconnected. Additionally, v is adjacent to w in G otherwise in a worst case global graph v is not reachable from u. If v has other adjacent vertices than u and w, the edge swap (v, w) increases the cost of u by at lease two while the edge swap decreases the cost of u by at least one. Hence, the degree of v must be two in G. Consequently, we have the statement.
Then we consider the MAX-SG. If there is a path uvw where the degree of v is two, u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w). If u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w), then the degree of v is two in G, otherwise the edge swap increases the cost of u by at least one. Consequently, we have the statement.
By Lemma 18, a graph is a swap equilibrium if it does not have any vertex of degree two. The graph shown in Figure 4 is a swap equilibrium with diameter Θ(n). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 19
For weakly pessimistic players with 2-local information, when n ≥ 4, PoA SUM (n, n− 1, 2) = Θ(n) and PoA MAX (n, n − 1, 2) = Θ(n).
We then present the PoA of the SUM-SG by weakly pessimistic players with 3-local information.
Theorem 20 For weakly pessimistic players with 3-local information, when n ≥ 16, PoA SUM (n, n− 1, 3) = Θ(n).
Proof.
We present a sum-swap equilibrium in the same manner as Theorem 9. For i = 1, 2, · · · , p, H i is a tree in which a i has five children b i , c i , d i , e i , and f i . For i = 0, p + 1, H i is a tree rooted at a i with four children b i , c i , d i , and e i . Then T S (p) is is a tree defined by We omit the detailed proof because it easy to check whether every player is unhappy or not in T S (p).
By Theorem 12, we have the following theorem because when a pessimistic player u is unhappy in graph G, u is unhappy in G when u is a weakly pessimistic player.
Theorem 21 When k ≥ 4, for weakly pessimistic players with k-local information, the diameter of a sum-swap equilibrium is at most two and PoA SUM (n, n − 1, k) = 1.
On the other hand, the diameter of any max-swap equilibrium is smaller than three for weakly pessimistic players with 3-local information.
Theorem 22 When k ≥ 3, for weakly pessimistic players with k-local information, the diameter of a max-swap equilibrium is at most two and PoA MAX (n, n − 1, k) = 1.
Proof. Assume that there exists a max-swap equilibrium G whose diameter is larger than two. Then, there exists a path P = uvwx in G that starts from a leaf u.
If the depth of T G,P (v) is smaller than two, then u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v, w) that keeps the maximum distance to vertices in its view unchanged.
If the depth of T G,P (v) is larger than one, then we can find a path P = u v w x such that u is a leaf and the depth of T G,P (v ) is at most one. More specifically, we choose an arbitrary leaf u with the largest depth in T G,P (v). There exists a path whose length is larger than three starting from u because there exists a path from u to v and a path vwx. Then the depth of T G,P (v ) is at most one. If the depth of T G,P (v ) is zero, u is unhappy as mentioned above. If the depth of T G,P (v ) is one, u is unhappy because of the edge swap (v , w ) that keeps the maximum distance to any vertex in its view unchanged. Hence, G is not a max-swap equilibrium.
We now consider graph G whose diameter is two, i.e., G is a star. The unique inner vertex player, say c, is not unhappy because it cannot perform any edge swap since V (G) \ N G (c) ∪ {c} = ∅. Any leaf player is not unhappy because any edge swap changes its cost from two to three. Thus, an arbitrary star graph is a max-swap equilibrium and the minimum social cost of the MAX-SG is achieved by a star graph. Thus, PoA(n, n − 1, k) = 1 for k ≥ 3.
Finally, we consider optimistic players. An optimistic player u with k-local information expects that a player at distance k has a long path that u cannot observe. Thus, u always perform an edge swap to create an edge connecting itself to another player at distance k if any.
Lemma 23 For optimistic players with k-local information, the diameter of any swap equilibrium is smaller than k.
Consequently, in a sum-swap equilibrium and a max-swap equilibrium, all optimistic players can observe the entire graph. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 24 For optimistic players with k-local information, PoA SUM (n, n − 1, k) = 1 and PoA MAX (n, n − 1, k) < 3/2.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced swap games with k-local information and investigated their dynamics and PoA. First, we showed that when k ≥ 4, starting from a tree, the SUM-SG and MAX-SG by pessimistic players with k-local information promise convergence to an equilibrium with constant PoA. In other words, in a distributed environment, rational participants can construct a tree of small diameter without global information.
We then introduced weakly pessimistic players to obtain a tree equilibrium with small PoA for k ≤ 3. When k = 3, the MAX-SG achieves a constant PoA, at the cost of best response cycles. Thus, relaxing pessimism does not promise distributed graph construction. Finally, we introduced optimistic players and presented the constant PoA of the SUM-SG and MAX-SG for any value of k.
There are many interesting future directions. One is a better upper bound and a lower bound of the number of edge swaps during convergence. Based on [15, 17] , we put our basis on the potential function for a game, however we do not know whether our upper bound is tight or not. The dynamics of non-pessimistic players is also an open problem.
Although games with imperfect information have been investigated in game theory, to the best of our knowledge, there are few games where each player knows the existence of only a part of players. We hope games in this form open up new vistas for game theory and distributed computing.
